4.4.4.1: Principles

Search the content

Table of Contents

The grounds for refusal of the lack of distinctive character, descriptive indications and common usage[1] are mitigated by the provisions of Art. 4 IV TMD, Art. 7 III EUTMR and § 8 III MarkenG. These provisions provide that a sign can obtain a distinctive character as a result of its use, which it did not originally have, and can therefore be registered as a trade mark.[2] German law (Section 8 III MarkenG) calls this - without distinction as to the substance - ‘enforcement’. The sign thus acquires through its use the distinctive character which it did not have immediately[3] and which is a prerequisite for its registration.[4] Obtaining a distinctive character through use does not create an autonomous right to registration of a trade mark.[5] Rather, it contains an exception to certain grounds for refusal and must therefore be interpreted in relation to these grounds for refusal.[6] The decisive factor here is therefore also the factual[7] assessment of whether, from the point of view of the relevant public,[8] the trade mark is capable of identifying the claimed product as originating from a particular undertaking and thus distinguishing this product from those of other undertakings.[9] Such distinctiveness can arise in particular after a normal process of familiarisation by the relevant public.[10]
For example, a geographical name can be registered as a trade mark if, as a result of its use, it has become capable of indicating origin. In such a case, the geographical name has acquired a new meaning that is no longer merely descriptive, which justifies its registration as a trade mark.[11] If, on the other hand, a sign is only understood as an indication of belonging to a certain group of companies, but not as an indication of the origin of a product from a very specific company, this cannot be used to establish distinctiveness.[12]
The extent to which there is an interest in keeping the name in question free for use by other companies plays no role in the examination of obtaining a distinctive character through use. However, the specific character of the name must be taken into account.
For example, a very well-known geographical name can only acquire distinctiveness through use if there is a long and intensive use of the trade mark by the company applying for registration. In the case of a name that is already known as a geographical indication for a certain group of goods, an undertaking applying for registration for a product in the same group must, a fortiori, demonstrate a particularly long and intensive use of the trade mark.[13] If, however, geographical indications are commonly used as an indication of origin in a sector - for example in the field of mineral waters or beers - the requirements may be less stringent.[14] Even in the case of the name ‘Kinder’ (children), which is plainly descriptive of the consumer groups for confectionery, it must be assumed that the trade mark must be almost unanimously recognised by the public.[15] In contrast, the shapes of new motor vehicle models regularly acquire distinctiveness shortly after their market launch, as the interested public registers the unfamiliar shape of a new model.[16]
Whether distinctiveness resulting from the use of a sign exists can only be determined in relation to the products labelled with it.[17] If the public knows a certain name as a trade mark for certain products, it may also tend to see the name as a trade mark for other, possibly related, products.[18] In particular, an economic approach must be taken, taking into account the legitimate interests of the trade mark proprietor.[19] In the case of a broad generic term, which covers a large number of product areas that differ in terms of purpose and target group, it is necessary that there is a sufficient degree of enforcement for the individual product subgroups covered by the generic term.[20] Individual evidence is also not required if it is established that several services of different types are typically supplied by one undertaking and that the relevant public, when using the most important of these services, also expects the provision of these other services.[21]
However, the intensive use of a clothing trade mark, for example, does not automatically mean that this trade mark has now also obtained a distinctive character for drinks and can be registered.[22] On the other hand, the term ‘ready-made cakes’ used in the list of goods and services is already so narrow that obtaining a distinctive character for ‘cream slices’ alone would be sufficient to justify registration for the term ‘ready-made cakes’.[23]
Obtaining a distinctive character through use must be based on the use of the trade mark as a trade mark,[24] i.e. its use as a sign to distinguish products. The mere sale of a product with the same design is not sufficient.[25] In particular, not every use of the trade mark, and certainly not every use of a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional trade mark, necessarily constitutes use as a trade mark.[26]
If, for example, a market participant was the sole supplier of certain goods on the market, extensive use of a sign consisting of the shape of those goods may be sufficient if, as a result of that use, a substantial part of the relevant public perceives an indication of origin from the shape.[27] Especially in such cases of a monopoly position, however, it must be carefully examined whether the public associates the indication in question with the supplier without at the same time seeing an indication of origin in it.[28] If, for example, a very specific - unpackaged - chocolate mould is known to the public, use as a trade mark is likely even if the product is normally sold packaged.[29] Even the sale of printed products under the same name does not necessarily lead to trade mark recognition if the name can be understood by the public as a description of the contents.[30]
The use of a colour in advertising or on the goods or their packaging can only be assumed as a trade mark in exceptional cases. In many product and service sectors, the relevant public is not accustomed to identifying an indication of origin from the use of a colour in advertising or on the packaging of goods without the addition of graphic elements or verbal elements, because a colour as such is generally not used to identify the origin of a particular undertaking, but only as a design element. However, an exception to this principle can be considered if the public is accustomed to the use of colours as a means of identification due to labelling habits in the goods or services sector in question.[31]
For example, the long-standing and consistent use of the colour yellow by Langenscheidt in the entire product segment of dictionaries in print form speaks in favour of its use as a trade mark. The fact that the colour is used together with other signs does not preclude the assumption of trade mark use.[32] In contrast, the total sales of Coca-Cola products cannot prove the use of a specific Coca-Cola bottle shape if it remains unclear in which packaged form the products were distributed.[33]
The term ‘use of the trade mark as a trade mark’ must be understood to refer only to use of the trade mark which serves to identify the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking by the relevant public.[34] According to the case law of the BGH,[35] even use in the form of a title is not sufficient[36] - questionable because use in the form of a title is not a category of harmonised law. On the other hand, use as part of an internet address can also refer to the products offered there and thus constitute use as a trade mark.[37] The use of a company name can also constitute ‘use as a trade mark’ if the company only uses a sign, which therefore always refers to the products offered.[38]
If, for example, the name ‘BATEAUX MOUCHES’ (= tourist boat) is used descriptively in advertising brochures, even the most intensive use cannot constitute trade mark use.[39] On the other hand, the use of a website ‘bet365.com’ as a relevant marketing channel for the products in question can constitute use as a trade mark.[40]
Such identification, and thus obtaining a distinctive character, can result both from the use of a partial component of a registered trade mark and from the use of another trade mark in conjunction with a registered trade mark.[41] In this context, the applicant must prove that the relevant public perceives the goods or services identified solely by this trade mark - and not by any other existing trade marks - as originating from a particular undertaking.[42] The BGH therefore requires specific proof - preferably by means of a market survey - that the part in question has also acquired distinctive character.[43] At the very least, it must be established that both parts of the sign are perceived by the public as independent signs.[44] These principles also apply to the basic part of a series of signs.[45]
For example, the use of the slogan ‘HAVE A BREAK. . . HAVE A KIT KAT’ can render the isolated element “HAVE A BREAK” distinctive.[46] The trade mark “bet365” can also obtain a distinctive character if it is sometimes used in combination with the word elements “bingo” or “.com”.[47] However, if the descriptive term ‘BSS’ in the sense of ‘Balanced Salt Solution’ is used in brochures for the products ‘ALCON BSS’ and ‘BSS PLUS’, this is rather an indication that the term ‘BSS’ is not sufficiently distinctive on its own without any other additional identifying element.[48] Even if the sign ‘INFOSECURITY’ is always used in advertising with the addition ‘EUROPE’, this does not result in obtaining a distinctive character due to the change in meaning.[49] In contrast, a three-dimensional trade mark may also acquire distinctive character through use if it is used in conjunction with a word mark or a figurative mark.[50] In particular, embellishments of a figurative mark may also be secondary to the overall impression of the trade mark in such a way that the distinctive character is not affected. [51] However, especially in the case of a basic sign element used as an umbrella mark for various products - such as the sign ‘kinder’ by Ferrero - this element may have a certain independence and thus have obtained a distinctive character in itself.[52] In contrast, the BGH did not allow the sign ‘T-’ of Deutsche Telekom to be registered without a market survey.[53] The exclamation mark in the trade mark ‘JOOP!’ could also not be found to have a distinctive character precisely because of the well-knownness of the main mark.[54]
In the case of a national trade mark, obtaining a distinctive character depends solely on the situation in the part of the territory of the Member State concerned in which the grounds for refusal have been found to exist.[55] Accordingly, Article 7 (3) EUTMR requires, in the case of the EU trade mark, that the trade mark has acquired distinctive character through use in all those - substantial[56] - parts of the EU in which a ground for refusal would be relevant. In principle, distinctive character must therefore be required throughout the EU.[57] Only the states that were members of the EU at the time of filing are relevant in this regard.[58] Paragraph (3) must be interpreted in the light of the principle of unitary character of the EU trade mark, which is reflected in the preamble and in Art. 59] Otherwise, one would also come to the paradoxical result that an applicant would have to prove that a national trade mark has been registered in the territory concerned, whereas an EU trade mark would be registered.[60] Thus, even if the qualitative requirements for the type of use correspond to those for genuine use[61], there is a difference between genuine use and proof of acquired distinctiveness with regard to the relevant territory.[62]
In the case of word marks, the relevant territories are those in the EU where a large proportion of consumers speak the language in which the ground for refusal exists. Beyond that, however, those territories in which the relevant public has at least a passive knowledge of the language in question are not to be taken into account.[63]
Thus, according to the GC's case-law, the relevant public for grounds for refusal in English is the public in Denmark, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom[64] and Cyprus.[65]
In the case of trade marks which are not word marks, on the other hand, it must be presumed that the assessment of their distinctive character is the same throughout the EU, unless there are concrete indications to the contrary.[66]
It is true that it goes too far to require proof for each individual Member State[67] if the evidence submitted, taken as a whole, allows the conclusion that distinctive character has been obtained in the EU.[68]In any case, proof of use in only one Member State[69] or in a significant part of the EU[70]is not sufficient. However, evidence may also be capable of proving acquired distinctiveness in several Member States at the same time or even in the EU as a whole[71], for example where, due to the geographical, cultural or linguistic proximity of two Member States, the relevant public of one Member State has sufficient knowledge of the goods or services existing on the national market of the other Member State.[72] Nor is acquired distinctiveness established if no data is available for a territory consisting of Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands.[73] Even if market penetration has been proven for an area in which 90% of the EU population lives, this should - too strictly - not suffice as long as gaps in evidence remain in the states of Belgium, Ireland, Greece and Portugal.[74] Nor can data from ten Member States be extrapolated to a further 17 states.[75] Evidence that does not originate from the protected territory, but e.g. from the USA, is normally of no value.[76]
If a trade mark is devoid of distinctive character on the filing date, but acquires it at a later date, the trade mark can be registered with the priority of this later date with the consent of the applicant The German legislator has made use of the option of Art. 4 V TMD through Sec. 37 II MarkenG. One of the reasons for the cessation of a ground for refusal under Section 8 II Nos. 1, 2 or 3 MarkenG is that the trade mark has become established after the filing date.[77]
If there is a long period between the filing date and the date on which a demoscopic expert opinion is prepared - for example 13 years - this generally excludes the assumption that the result of the expert opinion can be related to the filing date. Anything else can only apply in special cases subject to strict conditions. Such an exceptional case can be assumed if, in specific product areas, the products in question do not change rapidly, the market development can be reliably assessed over long periods of time and the circumstances in favour of market penetration are clear.[78] The same applies if the market survey is confirmed by a subsequent survey with similar results.[79]


Footnotes

  1. Art. 4 I lit. b, c and d TMD, Art. 6quinquies B No. 2 Paris Convention, Art. 7 I lit. b, c and d EUTMR, § 8 II No. 1 to 3 MarkenG.

  2. With regard to the relevant point in time, the comments above in Section 4.3.5 apply.

  3. CJEU C-136/02 P of 7 October 2004 Mag Instrument, ref. 49 f.

  4. CJEU C-108/97 and C-109/97 of 4 May 1999 Chiemsee, para. 44 f.; CJEU C-517/99 of 4 October 2001 Bravo, para. 30; CJEU C-299/99 of 18 June 2002 Philips/Remington, paras. 34 and 58; CJEU C-104/01 of 6 May 2003 Libertel, para. 67.

  5. Nor can a decision be challenged which certifies that the trade mark inherently lacks distinctive character but allows it to be registered as a result of obtaining a distinctive character: BGH I ZB 32/04 of 15 December 2005, ref. 7 ff.

  6. CJEU C-108/05 of 7 September 2006 Bovemij Verzekeringen, ref. 21.

  7. BGH I ZB 65/13 of 9 July 2015 Nivea-Blau, ref. 25; BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 19; BGH I ZB 39/16 of 6 April 2017 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 19. 2017 Schokoladenstäbchen III, ref. 20; BGH I ZB 97/16 of 5 October 2017 Pippi Langstrumpf trade mark, ref. 13; BGH I ZB 25/17 of 13 September 2018 Pippi Langstrumpf, ref. 16.

  8. See above Section 4.3.2.

  9. CJEU C-108/97 and C-109/97 of 4 May 1999 Chiemsee, paras. 46 and 54; CJEU C-299/99 of 18 June 2002 Philips/Remington, para. 35; also CJEU C-108/05 of 7 September 2006 Bovemij Verzekeringen, ref. 27; GC T-262/04 of 15 December 2005 BIC-Lighter I, ref. 61; GC T-263/04 of 15 December 2005 BIC-Lighter II, ref. 61; BGH I ZB 65/13 of 9 July 2015 Nivea-Blau, ref. 23.

  10. CJEU C-108/97 and C-109/97 of 4 May 1999 Chiemsee, ref. 49 and 54; CJEU C-104/01 of 6 May 2003 Libertel, ref. 67; CJEU C-136/02 P of 7 October 2004 Mag Instrument, ref. 47; CJEU C-24/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck I, ref. 70.

  11. CJEU C-108/97 and C-109/97 of 4 May 1999 Chiemsee, ref. 47.

  12. GC T-13/18 of 24 September 2019 Crédit Mutuel, ref. 134 et seq., appeal not allowed by CJEU C-867/19 P of 13 February 2020 Conféderation nationale du Mutuel.

  13. CJEU C-108/97 and C-109/97 of 4 May 1999 Chiemsee, ref. 48, 50 and 54; problematic BGH GRUR 2000, 608, 610 ARD-1.

  14. See GC T-122/17 of 25 October 2018 DEVIN, confirmed in conclusion by GC and CJEU C-800/18 P of 11 July 2019 Haskovo Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

  15. BGHZ 156, 112, 125 Kinder I; also BGH I ZB 11/04 of 19 January 2006 LOTTO, ref. 20; more cautious BGH I ZR 6/05 of 20 September 2007 Kinder II, ref. 28; BGH I ZR 94/04 of 20 September 2007 Kinderzeit, ref. 34; now BGH I ZB 94/06 of 2 April 2009 Kinder III [no cancellation of the word/figurative mark ‘kinder’].

  16. BGH I ZB 33/04 of 15 December 2005 Porsche Boxter, ref. 22 ff.

  17. CJEU C-517/99 of 4 October 2001 Bravo, ref. 30; CJEU C-299/99 of 18 June 2002 Philips/Remington, ref. 59; but see generously CJEU C-553/08 P of 2 December 2009 Powerserv Personalservice, ref. 77 ff.; GC T-237/01 of 5 March 2003 BSS, para. 51; GC T-174/07 of 28 January 2009 TDI II, para. 71 ff.; BGH GRUR 2001, 1042 REICH UND SCHÖN; BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, para. 63.

  18. BGH GRUR 1999, 728, 729 PREMIERE II.

  19. BGH I ZB 22/04 of 25 October 2007 Milchschnitte, ref. 26.

  20. BGH I ZB 65/13 of 9 July 2015 Nivea-Blau; BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 63.

  21. BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 63.

  22. See BGH GRUR 1990, 37 Quelle.

  23. BGH I ZB 22/04 of 25 October 2007 Milchschnitte, ref. 26; on this also BGH I ZB 65/13 of 9 July 2015 Nivea-Blau, ref. 44.

  24. GC and CJEU T-461/04 of 20 September 2007 PURE DIGITAL, ref. 76, confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-542/07 P of 11 June 2009 Imagination Technologies.

  25. CJEU C-299/99 of 18 June 2002 Philips/Remington, para. 64 f.; also CJEU C-353/03 of 7 July 2005 Nestlé, para. 26; CJEU C-24/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck I, para. 61; CJEU C-217/13 of 19 June 2014 Oberbank, ref. 40; CJEU C-215/14 of 6 September 2015 Société des Produits Nestlé, ref. 63; BGHZ 159, 57, 65 f. Farbige Arzneimittelkapsel; see also BGH I ZB 33/04 of 15.12.2005 Porsche Boxter, ref. 26; BGH I ZB 24/05 of 21.2.2008 VISAGE, ref. 23; BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23.10.2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb, ref. 14.

  26. CJEU C-24/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck I, ref. 62.

  27. CJEU C-299/99 of 18 June 2002 Philips/Remington, ref. 64 f.; respectively BGH I ZB 11/04 of 19 January 2006 LOTTO, ref. 18.

  28. BGH I ZB 96/05 of 27 April 2006 FUSSBALL WM 2006, ref. 26; I ZB 97/05 of 27 April 2006, ref. 26; I ZB 48/07 of 23 October 2008 POST II, ref. 21, in each case with reference to BGHZ 30, 357, 365 Nährbier.

  29. BGH I ZB 88/07 of 9.7.2009 ROCHER-Kugel, ref. 33 ff.; on colour combination marks GC T-137/08 of 28.10.2009 Grün, Gelb, ref. 36 f., appeal to CJEU C-553/09 P was withdrawn due to the settlement of the parties.

  30. GC T-117/18 of 26 June 2019 200 PANORAMICZNYCH, ref. 78 ff.; GC T-118/18 of 26 June 2019 300 PANORAMICZNYCH, ref. 78 ff.; GC T-119/18 of 26 June 2019 400 PANORAMICZNYCH, ref. 78 ff. 2019 400 PANORAMICZNYCH, ref. 78 ff.; GC T-120/18 of 26 June 2019 500 PANORAMICZNYCH, ref. 78 ff.; GC T-121/18 of 26 June 2019 1000 PANORAMICZNYCH, ref. 78 ff, all confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-664/19 P of 5 December 2019 Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol.

  31. BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23 October 2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb, ref. 15, with further references. N.; BGH I ZB 65/13 of 9 July 2015 Nivea-Blau, ref. 24; BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 25.

  32. BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23 October 2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb; also BGH I ZB 65/13 of 9 July 2015 Nivea-Blau, ref. 24.

  33. GC T-411/14 of 24 February 2016 Coca-Cola bottle, ref. 82 ff.

  34. CJEU C-353/03 of 7 July 2005 Nestlé, para. 29; CJEU C-24/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck I, para. 61; CJEU C-217/13 of 19 June 2014 Oberbank, para. 40; CJEU C-215/14 of 6 September 2015 Société des Produits Nestlé, paras. 63 and 65; see also BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23 October 2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb, para. 14.

  35. On the term below Section 20.1.

  36. BGH I ZB 65/12 of 17 October 2013 test, ref. 29.

  37. GC T-304/16 of 14 December 2017 bet365, ref. 42, confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-136/18 P of 6 September 2018 Hansen.

  38. GC T-304/16 of 14 December 2017 bet365, ref. 49 ff., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-136/18 P of 6 September 2018 Hansen.

  39. See GC T-365/06 of 10 December 2008 BATEAUX MOUCHES, ref. 40 ff., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-78/09 P of 24 September 2009 Compagnie des bateaux muches.

  40. GC T-304/16 of 14 December 2017 bet365, ref. 41 ff., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-136/18 P of 6 September 2018 Hansen.

  41. CJEU C-353/03 of 7 July 2005 Nestlé, ref. 27 ff.; CJEU C-24/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck I, ref. 57; CJEU C-245/06 P of 9 March 2007 Saiwa v OHIM, ref. 43; CJEU C-488/06 P of 17 July 2008 L & D. 17 July 2008 L & D, ref. 49; CJEU C-12/12 v. 18 April 2013 Colloseum Holding, ref. 27; CJEU C-252/12 v. 18 July 2013 Specsavers, ref. 23; CJEU C-215/14 v. 6.9.2015 Société des Produits Nestlé, ref. 64; also BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23.10.2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb, ref. 24; but see for the finding of fact in a conflict case GC T-344/03 of 5.4.2006 ORO/SELEZIONE ORO Barilla, ref. 37, confirmed by CJEU C-245/06 P of 9.3.2007 Saiwa v OHIM, ref. 43.

  42. CJEU C-215/14 of 6 September 2015 Société des Produits Nestlé, ref. 66 f.

  43. BGH I ZB 24/05 of 21 February 2008 VISAGE, ref. 37 ff.; BGH I ZB 39/09 of 10 June 2010 letter T with dash, ref. 23 ff.; see also BGH I ZB 70/07 of 21 February 2008 Melissengeist, ref. 17; on the relationship between the word mark and the graphic design of this sign also BGH I ZR 6/05 of 20 September 2007 Kinder II, ref. 29.

  44. BGH I ZB 65/12 of 17 October 2013 test, ref. 43.

  45. BGH I ZB 39/09 of 10 June 2010 Buchstabe T mit Strich, ref. 23 ff.

  46. CJEU C-353/03 of 7 July 2005 Nestlé, ref. 27 ff.

  47. GC T-304/16 of 14 December 2017 bet365, ref. 38 ff., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-136/18 P of 6 September 2018 Hansen.

  48. GC T-237/01 of 5.3.2003 BSS, ref. 58 f.; on shape marks also GC T-399/02 of 29.4.2004 Bottle with lime slice, ref. 51; BGHZ 159, 57 Farbige Arzneimittelkapsel; also BGHZ 52, 273 Streifenmuster; similar to the combination of a word mark with a shape mark whose distinctive character is to be proven: GC T-262/04 of 15 December 2005 BIC-Lighter I, ref. 84 ff.; GC T-263/04 of 15 December 2005 BIC-Lighter II, ref. 84 ff.

  49. GC T-633/13 of 23 September 2015 INFOSECURITY, ref. 81 ff.

  50. CJEU C-24/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck I, ref. 59; see also BGH I ZB 22/04 of 25 October 2007 Milchschnitte, ref. 25.

  51. BGH GRUR 2004, 331, 332 Westie-Kopf.

  52. BGH I ZB 94/06 of 2 April 2009 Kinder III.

  53. BGH I ZB 39/09 of 10 June 2010 Buchstabe T mit Strich, ref. 23 ff.

  54. GC T-75/08 of 30 September 2009 ! (exclamation mark), ref. 43; GC T-191/08 of 30 September 2009 ! (exclamation mark in a rectangle), ref. 44.

  55. CJEU C-108/05 of 7 September 2006 Bovemij Verzekeringen, ref. 22; CJEU C-553/08 P of 2 December 2009 Powerserv Personalservice, ref. 60.

  56. A Member State is ‘essential’ in this context: CJEU C-25/05 P of 22 June 2006 Storck II, ref. 83 ff.; CJEU C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, ref. 75; GC C-547/17 P of 6 September 2018 Basic Net, ref. 24; BGH I ZB 45/16 of 9 November 2017 OXFORD/Oxford Club, ref. 23; see also GC T-399/02 of 29 April 2004 Bottle with lime slice, ref. 43; GC T-262/04 of 15 December 2005 BIC Lighter I, ref. 62; GC T-263/04 of 15 December 2005 BIC Lighter II, ref. 62; GC T-388/04 of 5 April 2006 Triangle, ref. 43; GC T-152/07 of 14 September 2009 Geometric fields on numbered signs. 2009 Geometric fields on the dial of a watch, para. 133; GC T-359/12 of 21 April 2015 Louis Vuitton Malletier, para. 91; respectively on the well-known trade mark also GC C-375/97 of 14 September 1999 Chevy, para. 28.

  57. CJEU C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, ref. 76; CJEU C-547/17 P of 6 September 2018 Basic Net, ref. 25.

  58. GC T-7/09 of 21 April 2010 Chuck part with three grooves, ref. 46; GC T-761/14 of 23 February 2016 MANGO, ref. 20.

  59. GC T-91/99 of 30 March 2000 OPTIONS, paras. 23-27; GC T-237/01 of 5 March 2003 BSS, para. 52; GC T-16/02 of 3 December 2003 TDI I, para. 52; also GC T-435/07 of 26 November 2008 NEW LOOK, para. 20 ff.

  60. GC T-237/10 of 14 December 2011 Schließmechanismus, ref. 90 ff., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-97/12 P of 15 May 2014 Louis Vuitton Malletier.

  61. See Section 8 below.

  62. CJEU C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, ref. 69 ff.; also CJEU C-223/18 P of 6 June 2019 Deichmann, ref. 43.

  63. GC T-304/16 of 14 December 2017 bet365, ref. 32 f., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-136/18 P of 6 September 2018 Hansen.

  64. Before the Brexit.

  65. GC T-304/16 of 14 December 2017 bet365, ref. 32 ff., confirmed in the result by CJEU C-136/18 P of 6 September 2018 Hansen.

  66. GC T-399/02 of 29 April 2004 Bottle with a slice of lime, ref. 47; GC T-141/06 of 12 September 2007 Glass Pattern II, ref. 34 ff, confirmed in the result by GC C-513/07 P of 17 October 2008 AGC Flat Glass Europe; GC T-71/06 of 15 November 2007 Shape of the nacelle cladding of a wind energy converter, ref. 44, confirmed in the result by GC C-20/08 P of 9 December 2008 Enercon; GC T-8/08 of 10 March 2008 Shape of a shell, ref. 37; GC T-237/10 of 14 December 2011 Closing mechanism, ref. 90 ff, confirmed in conclusion by GC C-97/12 P of 15 May 2014 Louis Vuitton Malletier; see also GC T-207/06 of 14 June 2007 EUROPIG, ref. 58 f.; GC T-28/08 of 8 July 2009 Schokoriegel, ref. 46 f.

  67. GC C-98/11 P of 24 May 2012 Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, para. 62; GC C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, para. 77; cautious GC C-547/17 P of 6 September 2018 Basic Net, para. 26 ff.; also GC T-137/08 of 28 October 2009 Green, Yellow, para. 36 ff, Appeal to CJEU C-553/09 P was withdrawn due to the parties' settlement; GC T-359/12 v. 21 April 2015 Louis Vuitton Malletier, para. 92 f.; GC T-801/17 v. 14 December 2018 ORIGINAL excellent dermatest 3-star-guarantee, para. 75 f.; BGH I ZB 45/16 v. 9 November 2017 OXFORD/Oxford Club, para. 23.

  68. CJEU C-547/17 P of 6 September 2018 Basic Net, ref. 28.

  69. GC T-75/08 of 30 September 2009 ! (exclamation mark), ref. 41; GC T-191/08 of 30 September 2009 ! (exclamation mark in a rectangle), ref. 42.

  70. CJEU C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, ref. 78.

  71. CJEU C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, ref. 80.

  72. CJEU C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P and C-95/17 P of 25 July 2018 Société des produits Nestlé, ref. 82.

  73. GC T-318/09 of 6 July 2011 TDI, ref. 64 ff., appeal (case C-467/11 P before the CJEU) settled after withdrawal of the application.

  74. GC T-112/13 of 15 December 2016 Mondelez UK Holding, ref. 173 ff., challenged on appeal (case before the GC C-84/17 P Société des produits Nestlé, GC C-85/17 P Mondelez UK Holding and GC C-95/17 P EUIPO/Mondelez UK Holding).

  75. GC T-411/14 of 24 February 2016 Coca-Cola Bottle, ref. 79 ff.

  76. GC T-338/11 of 21 November 2012 PHOTOS.COM, ref. 56 ff., confirmed in conclusion by CJEU C-70/13 P of 12 December 2013 Getty Images.

  77. BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23 October 2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb, ref. 56.

  78. BGH I ZB 61/13 of 23 October 2014 Langenscheidt-Gelb; BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 50 and 100.

  79. BGH I ZB 52/15 of 21 July 2016 Sparkassen-Rot, ref. 50.